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Abstract:  Recent debates in International Relations seek to decolonise the discipline by 
focusing on relationality between self and other. This article examines the possibilities for 
preserving a particular type of otherness: ‘radical otherness’ or ‘alterity’. Such otherness can 
provide a bulwark against domination and colonialism: there is always something truly other 
which cannot be assimilated. However, two problems arise. First, if otherness is truly 
inaccessible, how can self relate to it? Does otherness undermine relationality? Second, can we 
talk about otherness without making it the same? Is the very naming of otherness a new form 
of domination? This article draws out and explores the possibilities for radical otherness in 
Sinophone and Anglophone relational theorising. It addresses the difficulties presented by the 
need for a sense of radical otherness on the one hand, and the seeming impossibility of either 
detecting it, or relating to it, on the other. By constructing a typology of four accounts of 
otherness, it finds that the identification and preservation of radical otherness poses significant 
problems for relationality. Radical otherness makes relationality between self and other 
impossible, but without radical otherness there is a danger of domination and assimilation. This 






What is the relation between self and other? Indeed, can there be a relation at all? This article 
shows new resources available to answer these questions, and highlights the complexities in 
trying to do so. In order to do so, this article focuses on recent debates surrounding relational 
theorising in International Relations (IR). Although there are different forms of relational 
thinking, it can be said that this approach takes as its starting point the idea that things are 
effects of relations, and that nothing can simply ‘be’ without being in relation. In charting the 
literature and debates around this idea, this article shows that not only are these debates 
internally complex but also have complex realtions to each other. At least three vectors can be 
considered to be in play. First, these debates can be characterised as drawing from different 
theoretical backdrops leading to a range of ontological and ethical commitments. Second, these 
debates can be chacterised as exploring the notions of self and other, East and West, ‘us’ and 
‘them’, whilst simultaneously challenging such constructions. Finally, debates over 
relationality now take place in a context of increasing calls for ‘worlding’ (Tickner and Blaney 
2012), ‘decolonizing’ the discipline (Gruffyd Jones 2006) ‘beyond the West’ and for a ‘global 
IR’ (Acharya 2014). As such there have been attempts to move away from what might be 
traditionally thought of as a ‘Western’ model of IR. 
 
It is against this background that this article makes its intervention. Specifically, this article 
focuses on the possibilities for preserving a particular type of otherness in these debates: 
‘radical otherness’ or ‘alterity’. This form of otherness is significant, because identifying and 
preserving it can provide a bulwark against domination and colonialism. There is always 
something that is truly other which cannot be incorporated, understood, synthesised, or 
assimilated. In order to achieve this goal this article constructs a typology for foregrounding 
‘radical otherness’ in the established IR debates. By highlighting ‘radical otherness’ in this way 
this tool necessarily intervenes to organise the material in the debates. It brings some things 
into the foreground (such a otherness and relationality), whilst leaving other concerns in the 
background. Although our endeavour is a theoretical one and remains at the level of abstraction, 
this intervention is significant as it lays the foundation for a clearer examination of examples 
and case studies by other scholars. 
 
Given that both the focus on ‘radical otherness’ and the method used to focus on it carry 
limitations and risks the next section discusses these. Next, after we have discussed the 
limitations of the typology, the remainder of this article goes on to trace ‘radical otherness’ in 
selected Anglophone and Sinophone relational theorising. It should be noted from the start that 
we do not attempt to encompass all the possible strands of this literature which would also 
include work originating from India (such as that of Nandy), North Africa (such as that of 
Memmi) and the Caribbean (such as that of Fanon). Instead our current focus and limitations 
of space mean that we will only examine dominant strands of scholarship originating from 
what many of these literatures call ‘the West’.  
 
Our typology identifies and names four specific models of self/other relationality: (1) role 
relationality, where there are different roles, but no theorised relation to otherness; (2) 
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hierarchical relationality, where the other awaits incorporation into the self; (3) dialectic 
relationality, where the other is in the self and the self is in the other; and (4) aporetic 
relationality, where the other is anterior to the self. Each type has its limits for thinking 
relationality and otherness, and raises questions and challenges to the others. The presentation 
of these models also draws attention to the differing construction and priorities that are present 
in their ethical understanding of the relation between self and other. What the typology 
highlights is the complex web of interconnections between the models of self and other when 
viewed through the lens of ‘radical otherness’. As will be seen, although the typology brings 
some coherence to this complex picture it also begins to indicate how that coherence is less 
stable than might be thought. In creating this picture, the typology also shows the instability of 





Before we can investigate ‘radical otherness’ through our typology it is important to note two 
features of our endeavour. The first concerns the notion of typology itself. The typology is not 
just ‘there’ but – as indicated above – is a part of an intervention. That intervention does not 
simply occur in a vacuum. It is an active naming and ordering of material to serve a purpose. 
The second concerns what ‘radical otherness’ or ‘alterity’ is and why it is important. Moreover, 
it also concerns the limitations of the concept itself. In using this concept we acknowledge that 
it is a foundational assumption. It could be that readers challenge the construction or the 
existence of such alterity. This article does not intend to defend alterity or to mount a discussion 
of its epistemological and ontological status per se. Instead, the employment of alterity in this 
article is justified by its usefulness. In other words, the use of alterity allows us to bring a 
certain kind of order to our subject matter, and to highlight some similarities and contrasts. As 
such, we are mindful that such interventions must always be accompanied by some violence. 
Thus, this theoretical endeavour is an attempt to both see and understand. However, we do not 
merely record what is there. The exercise is also a demonstration of the appearance and 
disappearance of this radical other for relationality. As we discuss radical otherness (and its 
relation to the self) we rely on what it excludes – the other senses of otherness and self. Thus, 
when outlining and ordering the literature below, we are conscious that things could be 
arranged differently, depending on what sense of ‘self and other’ is brought into relief. The 
appearance of such otherness looks very different in different strands of relational thinking, as 
does its relation to the imagined self. 
 
The first limitation revolves around the selection and ordering of our material. In this article 
we discuss literature which often self-identifies (and identifies its ‘other’) in binary opposites 
such as East and West, Anglophone and Sinophone, Colonial and de-colonial. In addition, 
many of the authors that we cite draw their resources from what they identify as a particular 
tradition of thinking. There are obvious strategic reasons for Chinese scholars to identify their 
work with ‘Chinese tradition’ when they are operating in an academic context that is dominated 
by Anglophone scholarship and that arguably marginalises China as the ‘Other country’ and 
its scholars as informants (cf. Chow 1991, Kristensen and Nielsen 2013). We would argue in 
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addition that these authors do not simply report ‘what is there’ but , by speaking and acting as 
if distinct traditions existed, they in part constitute them. This article is no different insofar as 
we also ‘constitute’ what we discuss. However, we nevertheless follow the self-identification 
of our authors in order to elucidate features of the debates that they have engaged in, and 
ultimately to unravel or destabilise some of the categories and assumptions that they make. 
This is especially true of the essentialisation of East and West, which in many ways stands as 
a proxy for the essentialisation of self and other. Our focus on alterity is, in part, an attempt to 
find a device to effect this work of destabilisation. 
 
This leads to the second limitation: the use of ‘others’, ‘self’ and ‘alterity’. Two problems arise. 
These problems are theoretical in nature: (1) If this form of otherness is truly inaccessible, how 
can the self relate to it? (2) Does talking of this kind of otherness threaten the very domination 
it seeks to avoid? This article explores the possibilities for this form of otherness in both 
Anglophone and Sinophone relational theorising in IR. It does so by comparing and contrasting 
scholarship that draws on what its authors tend to call Chinese and Western traditions, 
identifying points of convergence and divergence as well as discussing the multiple ways in 
which otherness is used in this literature. The purpose of this article is to highlight the 
difficulties that the need for a sense of radical otherness presents on the one hand, and the 
seeming impossibility of either detecting it or relating to it, on the other. 
 
However, herein lays the third limitation and difficulty with our endeavour. Both ‘self’ and 
‘other’ are Western (indeed, Anglophone) terms, interwoven with a number of related terms, 
including us and them, sameness and difference, friend and enemy, and so on. Chinese 
language has a similar array of terms that are used to discuss the type of concern that is our 
focus here, where ziwo (自我) and tazhe (他者) are probably the closest terms in use. Our use 
here of the Anglophone ‘self’ and ‘other’ limits what can be seen and understood. Moreover, 
even within the confines of the English language, self and other have a complex lexical relation. 
Whilst ‘self’ and ‘other’ are often contrasted, their meanings are not stable. For our present 
purposes it is useful to identify and compare three uses of ‘self’: (1) as a subject in the sense 
of an individual or person differentiated from other subjects; (2) as the same which is contrasted 
to the other as difference; and (3) as knowable and accessible, contrasted to the other as 
unknowable and inaccessible. Although this article focuses on the third meaning, inevitably its 
focus is not unqualified. Self and other indicate a complex of related meanings, and these 
meanings come to influence and support each other. The other senses of the word ‘haunt’ the 
preferred usage – indeed, they help to structure it.  
 
There are then, three senses of self and other and a word or two needs to be said about how 
they are related. First, ‘self’ is sometimes used as a synonym for ‘the subject’. In much Western 
tradition (particularly in liberal and enlightenment thought), this has been predominantly 
(although not exclusively) realised in terms of a bounded individual, separate from others, 
possessing special access to their own body and mind. Here ‘self’ means a subject in relation 
to other subjects. The self indicates personhood or individuality and although that person lives 
in a social world of other persons their self is taken to be distinct and complete in its own right. 
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This is reflected in a strand of European thought which takes the self to be an a priori 
philosophical construct. In this strand of thought the self is assumed to be complete and exists 
before any relations to others, or any experience of the world. Such selves form a starting point 
for political theorising in which the self has intrinsic qualities and rights before their 
engagement with others in society. The second sense maps sameness and difference onto self 
and other. Here the idea is that the ‘self-same’ is that which shares the qualities of the self (for 
example, the friend is another self not only because they are another subject, but also because 
they are like their friend, cf. Smith, 2011). Otherness is understood in terms of difference.  
 
These two senses of self and other can be compared to the third sense that we are especially 
interested in here: what we term ‘radical otherness’ or alterity. This third sense of otherness 
constructs self as that which we can know and have access to, and otherness as the unknowable 
and inaccessible. As a result, this sense of otherness indicates a limit to assimilation, 
categorization, and understanding. The other is constructed as a hard limit for the self, a limit 
that cannot be broached and assimilated. Although pinning the other down in definition 
necessarily does some injustice to this otherness of the other, we may borrow from Levinas to 
note that: ‘The alterity of the absolutely other is not an original quiddity of some sort…. The 
Other is not a particular case, a species of alterity, but the original exception to the order’ 
(Levinas 1998: 12-13). However, it is the very inaccessibility of radical otherness which 
suggests the impossibility of relationality. 
 
This third sense of otherness also returns us to decolonisation. Decolonizing efforts aim to 
challenge the tendency in Eurocentric tradition to devalue, deny, or disallow other ontologies 
and epistemic worlds (see e.g. Ling, 2014). This Eurocentric tradition tends to allow for 
otherness as difference, but it finds it harder to accommodate otherness as alterity. This is not 
universally so. In twentieth century continental theorising the notion of ‘alterity’ has been 
entertained by figures such as Levinas and Derrida. This is another instance of the transience 
of the categories of East and West which are often used to speak as if there were two opposed 
and unified traditions. Nevertheless, the dominant trend of Eurocentric theorising and policy 
has been to see others as somehow like the same – albeit inferior or less civilised (see for 
example Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004). In contrast to such Eurocentric tradition, the ‘other’ 
that is of concern to decolonizing debates is therefore not simply the understandable or 
fathomable difference that permeates IR, but the more profound alterity that extends beyond 




Typology: Four Forms of Relationality 
 
1) Role relationality: different roles, but no relation to otherness 
 
‘Role relationality’ theorises what are arguably relations between the self and another self, 
rather than the self and an other in the sense outline above. Such a model is found in variants 
of network theory, some pragmatist work, the bulk of ‘mainstream constructivism’, and role 
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theoretical work based on both Chinese and Western traditions. These accounts correspond to 
what Nexon and Jackson refer to as primarily ‘positional’ analysis in their contribution to this 
special issue. Such accounts have made significant and valuable contributions to relational 
thinking. However, their contribution to thinking about relationality and otherness as alterity 
is limited because they are confined to considering knowable difference in a shared world of 
knowledge. 
 
Wendt’s work Social Theory of International Politics provides an illustrative example (Wendt 
1999). For Wendt, constructivism is not a theory of IR, but a way of approaching ontology that 
is applied to a subject matter or field of enquiry (Wendt 1999, 7). This ontology gives us a 
classic understanding of self and other as co-constitutive. As Wendt writes: 
in initially forming shared ideas about Self and Other through a learning process, 
and then in subsequently reinforcing those ideas casually through repeated 
interaction, Ego and Alter are at each stage jointly defining who each of them is 
(Wendt 1999, 335). 
While this language might suggest that the ideas of self and other are doing significant work, 
there is no room in Wendt’s theorization for the self to relate to otherness. The truly other is 
absent from theorisation. Wendt clearly uses the language of self and other. However his 
construction and use of ‘the other’ is developed in such a way as to empty the other of their 
otherness and make them necessarily relate to, and assimilate into, the world of the self or same. 
In other words, whilst Wendt talks about the self and other, his use of ‘other’ is such that it can 
only appear when incorporated into the conceptual framework of the same. This is a very 
different use of the term to the ‘radical otherness’ sketched above, which cannot be 
incorporated into a conceptual framework of the self and same but remains a limit to it. 
 
This absence of otherness comes to the fore in Wendt’s insistence that the roles states can take 
in relation to one another (enmity, rivalry or friendship) are only possible within a shared 
culture, as he sees ‘roles as properties of macro-structures, as collective representations’ 
(Wendt 1999, 257, see also 249, 251 for further comments). Indeed, the very first page of Social 
Theory of International Politics makes very clear that in his view ‘the structures of human 
association are determined primarily by shared ideas’ (Wendt 1999, 1). Wendt’s cultures of 
anarchy do not depend on difference or alterity between the actors whose relations he wishes 
to theorise, but on what understandings they share. If this is the case then there is no room for 
radical otherness. Otherness is a limit to Wendt’s framework of shared cultures, but it is a limit 
that he does not sufficiently theorise. What is at stake here is that Wendt can only theorise 
otherness when it is linked to, and a function of, sameness. Otherness appears as a placeholder 
in the script of the same, it is not presented as a limit or rupture to that script. 
 
In this respect it is worth considering Wendt’s theorisation of the ‘first encounter’ between 
Cortés and Moctezuma (Wendt 1999, 158; for previous discussions of this encounter see: 
Inayatullah and Blaney 1996, 71-74; Pasic 1996, 87-90; Ling 2014, 30; Nordin and Smith 
2018, 381-2; cf. Zehfuss 2001, 326-7). On Wendt’s reading, when Cortés and Moctezuma 
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meet, they are truly other or alien to one another, and neither fits into the other’s script or 
existing world view. As Wendt explains the matter, ‘[it is an empirical question whether 
actors share any ideas, and sometimes they do not. When the Spaniards encountered the 
Aztecs in 1519, their interaction was highly structured by their beliefs about each other, 
beliefs that were rooted in pre-Encounter experiences and thus not shared’ (Wendt 1999, 
158). Wendt uses this encounter to illustrate his claim that culture needs to be shared, which 
means that these actors cannot be said to take on any of his three ‘roles’ until the other has 
been brought into the culture or epistemic realm of the self. Their initial relation – a relation 
between genuinely or radically self and other – defines what cannot be theorized within 
Wendt’s constructivist view of ‘relations.’ His shared culture cannot exist between self and 
other in this sense, which limits the relations he can theorise to that between a self and what 
we may better understand as another self. As he puts it, ‘[b]y taking a particular role identity 
Ego is at the same time “casting” Alter in a corresponding counter-role that makes Ego's 
identity meaningful’ (Wendt 1999, 329). Therefore, Wendtian identity is central and possible 
precisely because in others the self sees not alterity and difference, but an Alter Ego (Nordin 
and Smith 2018, 382). 
 
Wendt’s notion of roles is clearly derivative of a particular Western experience (Wendt 1999, 
258-259). Elsewhere, scholars have suggested that Chinese tradition offers a more genuinely 
relational manner of understanding roles. Notably, Taiwanese scholars Shih Chih-yu and 
Huang Chiung-chiu offer what they term the ‘balance of relationship’ as an alternative 
framework to the realist ‘balance of power’ (Huang and Shih 2014; Huang 2015; Shih 2016). 
Huang suggests that the balance of relationship reflects a systemic force which ‘drives states 
to seek long-term reciprocal relationship regardless of differences in values, regime type, and 
power status,’ and which ‘becomes the main theme of foreign policy especially in states whose 
domestic culture (political as well as social) provides strong support for the relation-oriented 
strategic thinking’ as is said to be the case in, for example, Taiwan, Singapore, Myanmar, and 
China (Huang 2015, 193, 194; Shih 2016). On this view, such states act with self-restraint to 
‘acquire stable relationships or to rectify a wrong relationship’ (Huang 2015, 193).  
Huang focuses her analysis on bilateral relationships, and Shih elsewhere suggests that such a 
bilateral or dyadic focus is particular to Chinese IR. To Shih, this focus is rooted in ‘the 
reciprocal bilateralism of Confucianism,’ in contrast with the multilateral relationality of 
‘Western IR’ (Shih 2016, 682). Like many other scholars who draw on Chinese tradition, Shih 
is interested in emphasizing how this approach differs from what are understood as ‘Western’ 
approaches. According to Shih, ‘indigenous’ Chinese theorists (including Qin, discussed below 
and contributing with Nordin to this special issue), claim that actors seek to construct a 
collective ‘greater self’ and secure their own role therein, to be favourably treated as part of 
the in-group, and avoid discrimination directed against the out-group. Shih contrasts his 
‘Chinese’ version of relationality with Wendtian constructivism. Yet he seems to share 
Wendt’s ontological position that actors are co-constitutive only insofar as they share an 
established relationship and understanding of their reciprocal obligations in that relationship. 
As in Wendt’s analysis, ‘roles taken by one constitute one’s self-identity,’ and ‘nations are 
defined by their identities vis-a-vis their multiple dyadic selves, not by what they are 
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themselves’ (Shih 2016, 685, 687). 
Importantly, ‘relationality is a process of reproducing hypothetically established relationships, 
not one of re/constructing fresh relations as in Jackson and Nexon’s formulation’ (Shih 2016, 
685). Just as Wendt cannot theorise the first encounter between Cortés and Moctezuma within 
his framework, so too can Huang and Shih’s version of the balance of relationship only account 
for relations between those who already share culture. Again, there seems to be little room for 
radical otherness in the sense we set out in the introduction to this article. Shih turns away from 
relational ontology as change (which he associates with Wendt and Hegelian dialectics), in 
favour of an allegedly Chinese view which requires ‘no ontological adaptation,’ and where 
‘each Chinese self acquires the skill to adapt, thus ensuring their continuous belonging to the 
same and known greater self’ (Shih 2016, 687). Actors (states) may take on different roles at 
different points in time, but the ‘selves’ that interact in this balance of relationship and the roles 
they can take are prescribed. Moreover, ‘differences pose no barrier to one’s inclusion in the 
dyadic self, as long as the roles required by the relationship are faithfully enacted’ (Shih 2016). 
What Shih elsewhere discusses in terms of a specifically Asian self is therefore understood by 
him literally as ‘the self that has no other’ (Shih 2010). 
Wendt’s constructivism, and Huang and Shih’s ‘balance of relationship’, have both made 
significant and welcome contributions to understanding the way actors change their roles, 
identities, intentions, and behaviours through interaction. However, the ontological category 
of the self that defines these actors remains fixed. The self in these theories either has no other, 
or is unable to ‘relate’ to otherness. As such, these types of analyses may deploy the language 
of the ‘relationality’ of ‘self’ and ‘other,’ but remain firmly defined by what other literatures 
on relationality have termed an ‘ontology of things,’ as opposed to a ‘relational ontology’ 
(Jackson and Nexon 1999; Nordin and Smith 2018). Nevertheless, these approaches help raise 
and address important questions, questions which have both empirical and normative 
dimensions: What roles, identities, intentions, and behaviours can we observe as emerging 
from discursive and material processes? How are various ‘selves’ or ‘identities’ produced by 
specific distinctions? In what ways do such ‘selves’ relate and create shared understandings of 
their respective roles? 
 
 
2) Hierarchical relationality: the other awaits incorporation into the self 
 
The constructivist scholarship discussed above is also representative of a significant portion of 
work emerging from the contemporary Chinese academe. Simultaneously, other Sinophone 
scholars have focused on theorising world relations based on what philosopher Zhao Tingyang, 
in line with Shih, calls a ‘Chinese ontology, the ontology of relations, instead of the western 
ontology of things’ (Zhao 2006b, 33). Zhao has also put forward one of the most influential 
proposals for how to theorise through relations developing the Ancient Chinese concept of 
Tianxia, which he variously translates as ‘the world,’ ‘empire’, or ‘All-under-heaven’ (Zhao 
2005; 2006b).  
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Whereas Wendt is content to accept and theorise the international state-system, Zhao is criticial 
of its Western-centrism. He argues that instead of viewing the world from one country’s point 
of view, his Tianxia can offer ‘a view from nowhere’ or a view ‘from the world’ (Zhao 2005; 
2006b). Such a holistic approach to world order should be led by a normative commitment to 
a harmony of difference, rather than sameness or unity: 
 
given that the world is in a state of existing difference, and difference can take the 
form of conflict, there are at least two kinds of schemes of resolution (jiejue 
fang’an 解决方案), one is “unity” (tong 同), that is the unification (tongyi 统一) 
of value systems and ideologies. This scheme is unworkable, because “unity 
cannot endure” (tongzebuji 同则不继). The other kind is “harmony” (he 和), that 
is establishing maximized mutual benefit of mutual coordination in the midst of 
difference (Zhao 2006a, 1). 
 
Furthermore, Zhao criticises the state system because ‘[s]uch projects have essential 
difficulties in reaching the real integrality of the world,’ and what is needed is ‘“inclusion of 
all” in All-under-Heaven,’ and ‘wholeness or totality rather than the between-ness’ (Zhao 
2006b, 33, 37, 39). In a similar way to Wendt or Huang and Shih, Zhao therefore begins by 
insisting on a relational ontology, but ends up emphasising the homogeneity of his all-
inclusive space. As such, he argues that ‘all political levels . . . should be essentially 
homogenous or homological so as to create a harmonious system’, that ‘[t]he world’s 
effective political order must progress from All-under-Heaven, to state, to families, so as to 
ensure universal consistency and transitivity in political life, or the uniformity of society’, and 
again that ‘any inconsistency or contradiction in the system will be a disaster’ (Zhao 2006b, 
33, emphasis in original). This will be achieved by transforming the ‘many’ into ‘the one’ 
(Zhao 2005, 13, also pointed out by Callahan 2008, 257). As in the analyses by Wendt or 
Huang and Shih, what appears to get lost in Zhao’s insistence on uniformity is sustained 
relationality to genuine otherness. 
Zhao’s form of relationality differs most clearly from Wendt’s, Huang’s and Shih’s in that 
Zhao’s Tianxia system is not simply explanatory, but explicitly utopian. It seeks to explain the 
world, and create a better world. Moreover, in order for the existing world with all its 
heterogeneity to pass into such homogeneity, some people must change (Nordin 2012, 237; 
2016a, 50). Zhao explains that: 
one of the principles of Chinese political philosophy is said “to turn the enemy 
into a friend”, and it would lose its meaning if it were not to remove conflicts and 
pacify social problems – in a word, to “transform” (hua 化) the bad into the good 
(Zhao 2006b, 34). 
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Zhao maintains that transformation will come through ‘voluntariness’; people will simply see 
how good the Tianxia elites are, and will want to become like them without proselytism (Zhao 
2006b, 36).1  
This understanding of hierarchy as a normative good stands out as a clear departure from many 
non-Chinese accounts of relationality which imply (but rarely explicitly defend) some form of 
epistemic equality or democracy as a benefit of relational thinking. In contrast, Zhao’s project 
is led by (Chinese) elites. As he frankly claims, ‘most people do not really know what is best 
for them, but … the elite do, so the elite ought genuinely to decide for the people’ (Zhao 2006b, 
32). Zhao suggests that the benefit of such a ‘civilization/barbarism’ interaction in Chinese 
history was an objective discussion of the long term advantages and disadvantages of different 
cultures (Zhao 2005). However, many critics have agreed with William A. Callahan that Zhao’s 
vision ‘sounds like a hierarchy of cultures analogous to modern racism and the PRC’s current 
concern with the “population quality” of its ethnic minorities and of the peoples of the world’ 
(Callahan 2008, 755; Barabantseva 2009; Nordin 2012, 237-238; 2016a, 50-51). The adoption 
of  hierarchy as a good resonanates with a highly patriarcal Ancient Chinese tradition, that was 
often elaborated as a guide to self-cultivation for the elite ‘gentlemen’ (junzi 君子). Such 
gentlemen were to govern Tianxia. Notably, questions of gender have been absent from its 
contemporary theorisation. Parallells could also be drawn to other teleological ‘progress’ 
stories that operate on the possibility of turning other into self. In such stories, others are not 
really different, but just behind. Eventually, they will become like us.2  
Critics may be sceptical of Zhao’s account which actively calls for the eradication of those who 
do not fit into the elite’s preferred order by turning the other into self. According to Zhao, and 
despite his apparent rejection of ‘unity’ (tong 同 ), it is only after such conversion into 
‘homogeneity’ that we can reach enough epistemic and ontological coherence to speak of a 
‘world’ (shijie 世界) at all (Zhao 2005, 13; Zhao 2006b). He is explicit that such a world has 
‘no outside’ (wuwai 无外). This normative insistence on one homogeneous world conflicts 
with decolonial literatures. Such literatures insist on the ontological multiplicity of ‘worlds’ in 
coexistence as a prerequisite for relational thinking and for giving parity to non-Eurocentric 
knowledge systems such as the Chinese tradition of thinking in terms of Tianxia (Rojas, 2016). 
Scholars who support democracy on the baisis that it promotes equality might be tempted to 
simply dismiss Zhao’s account due to its justifiaction of inequality. However, a careful reading 
of Zhao reveals that he not only justifies inequality, but that he also works with a certain notion 
of equality. This notion is different to those supported by many other IR scholars. We suggest 
that the questions it raises are pressing. Is it not also true that democratic traditions often 
construct what they consider to be acceptable inequalities, especially in the form of outsiders 
who are excluded from a given democratic system? What, then, is the place of hierarchy in 
                                                
1	For discussion of the way this hierarchy in Zhao plays out specifically through ‘friendship’ as one of the five 
Confucian relationships, see Nordin and Smith (2018).	
2	See Nordin (2016a) and Nordin (2016b) for discussion of this move in broader comparisons of European 
democracy and Chinese harmony. 
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these different traditions of relational thinking? If the commitment to relational ontology is not 
in itself uniquely Chinese (as Zhao suggests, but this special issue disputes), is the Chinese 
approach distinctive simply because of its overtly normative commitment to hierarchy? If this 
is so, what does that mean for its potential contribution to a post-Western or decolonial project? 
How might it respond to feminist critiques of the family as a model of good hierarchical 
governance? Can Tianxia be further theorised as conceivable within a pluriverse, or how can 
it otherwise provide a better relational alternative to pluriversal thinking? If Tianxia is indeed 
a revived defence of Empire and of the hierarchy of cultures, what makes it more palatable 
than Western iterations? Conversely, what is so wrong with hierarchy? Scholars committed to 
equality or democracy as a normative feature of relationality are directly challenged by Chinese 
scholars like Zhao to explicitly defend their position in the context of decolonial struggles in 
and beyond the academe. 
 
 
3) Dialectic relationality: the other is in the self and the self is in the other 
 
Another increasingly influential approach in Sinophone thought is the ‘golden mean’ or  
zhongyong (中庸) dialectic that is illustrated by the Daoist yin-yang (阴阳) symbol. This 
symbol consists of a circle formed of two halves, one black, one white. There is a black dot in 
the white, and a white dot in the black. 
 
 
Figure 1: Yin-yang (Wikimedia commons, 2012). 
Qin Yaqing has been important in advocating this approach as a Chinese way of thinking about 
relationality, as embodied in the concept guanxi (关系) (Qin 2009, 9; 2016, 39; 2018; and his 
contribution with Nordin to this special issue). His account of relationality has become a key 
reference point for many who write about relationality in Chinese IR theorising, including 
Huang and Shih as discussed above. Like Zhao and Shih, Qin associates relationality with 
China and ‘Confucian communities of practice’, contrasting this to ‘rationality’ which is said 
to represent the background knowledge of Western societies (Nordin and Qin in this issue). 
 
Qin suggests that Chinese yin-yang thinking escapes the dichotomising binaries of Western 
traditions of thought. According to Qin, Western thought tends to understand A and non-A as 
irreconcilable because they have essentially different properties, even if they are taken to 
interrelate in a Hegelian-style dialectic. Qin advocates a ‘Chinese dialectic’ where A can be 
non-A or include non-A. The process of relationships transform the behaviour and the essential 
properties of actors involved, so that A can transform non-A or be transformed into non-A. 
Thus, yin-yang relationality, ‘denies the dichotomously structured concept of “thesis vs. anti-
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thesis” or “us vs. them.”’ (Qin 2016, 40). Elsewhere, David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames also 
explain such a relationality in terms of non-binary contrast: 
Yin and yang are not, as is so often claimed, dualistic principles of light and dark… 
where light and dark exclude each other, logically entail each other, and in their 
complementarity constitute a totality. Rather yin and yang are, first and foremost, 
a vocabulary of qualitative contrasts which are applicable to specific situations, 
and which enable us to make specific distinctions (Hall and Ames 1995, 261). 
Yin and yang characterize particular relationships that enables one to unravel patterns of 
relatedness and to interpret specific circumstances. It is only through a process of 
generalization that, for example, gender traits constructed as feminine and masculine have been 
construed as predominantly yin and yang respectively, and the contrast essentialized (Hall and 
Ames 1995, 261). That is not to say that Chinese tradition has not been patriarchal – it certainly 
has (Wolf 1994). However, it indicates that the conceptual framework itself has less in common 
with theories that reify or seek to affirm such binaries. The yin and yang framework is instead 
more akin to those postcolonial, poststructuralist, feminist and queer theoretical approaches 
that focus on deconstructing essentialist binaries and demonstrating their contingency. 
Such a postcolonial feminist understanding of yin-yang relationality is at the root of L. H. M. 
Ling’s ‘worldism’ and Daoist dialectic (Ling 2014). Ling critiques what she calls ‘Westphalia 
World’, the common understanding or hegemonic vision of IR that includes ‘mainstream 
approaches’ characterised by an ontology of things. Ling shows how this view and its ontology 
‘perpetrates a profound violence’ by denying its reliance on those it excludes, along with their 
knowledges and ways of knowing, what she calls ‘Multiple Worlds’. These worlds are indeed 
multiple, consisting of ‘the fundamental contributions made to world politics by others, by the 
subaltern, their knowledges and ways of knowing’ (editor’s preface to Ling 2014, xv). Ling 
also reacts against Wendt’s claim that first encounters like those between Cortés and 
Moctezuma led to an accretion of culture at the systemic level, leaving the enemy, the rival and 
the friend as the only roles available to others, locking out any other considerations of relations 
among worlds (Ling 2014, 30). Such an ontology of things creates a ‘“postcolonial anxiety” 
which festers in Multiple Worlds; this aggravates a “colonial anxiety” in Westphalia World’ 
(Ling 2014, 3), leading to a nihilistic logic where the lives of others are forfeited to save one’s 
own.  
Ling offers a Daoist dialectic as an alternative to this violent and anxious worldview. In such 
a Daoist dialectic the ‘complementarities (yin) prevail despite the contradictions (yang) 
between and within the polarities. Nothing remains static or the same’ (Ling 2014, 15). This 
worldview strives to re-centre marginalised contributions to world politics, conceptualising 
their ontological parity with Westphalia world. It is thus a response to the negative spiral of 
violence and anxiety in the relation between Westphalia World and Multiple Worlds: 
A dao of world politics propels us from this dilemma. In recognizing the ontological 
parity of things, a post-Westphalian IR experiences the constant potential of creative 
transformations due to the mutual interactions that transpire, especially between 
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opposites. Multiplicity and difference manifest, enacted by local agents and their 
transformations of knowledge (Ling 2014, 3). 
In contrast to Wendt’s account of relations which falls back on an ontology of things, this 
worldview emphasizes the complexity of a self which includes elements of the other. The 
language of yin and yang does not in itself guarantee that any analysis of concrete terms or 
encounters follows through on this aspiration to recognise the other in the self and vice versa. 
Instead, the suggestion here is that the language and tradition from which it stems never 
operated through thinking in terms of binary exclusions in the first place. Thus it can provide 
a resource for those who endeavour to make space for alterity, hybridity, and between-ness in 
IR theorising. The point, it should be clear, is not to replace Westphalia World with Multiple 
Worlds, or for the ontology of things to be superseded by relational ontologies. Rather, the 
Daoist dialectic urges us to move closer towards balance and engagement. In Ling’s terms, 
‘[f]ortified with Daoist dialectics, worldism re-visibilizes Multiple Worlds in relation to one 
another as well as to Westphalia World’ (Ling 2014, 18). Equally, it makes multiple relational 
ontologies visible again, both in relation to one another and in relation to the ontology of things 
(Nordin and Smith 2018, 389). The area of intersection between different ontologies forms a 
dialogical space. However, unlike the Socratic dialogue, Daoist dialectics do not presuppose 
that there is a stable and discoverable truth independent of human perspectives (Ling 2014, 66). 
The point here is not to adjudicate between these ontologies, but to identify the contrast 
between them. This contrast is important because it can produce different political 
consequences. It is this politics of how self and same respond to otherness and difference which 
is at stake here. 
Ling’s insistence on this contrapuntuality between West and Rest, Self and Other, ‘to jointly 
produce the complicities that endure despite and sometimes because of the mutual conflicts 
that tear them apart’ adds an important emphasis to Qin’s account (Ling 2014, 45). Qin is 
clearly aware that the relational ontology he advocates is not uniquely Chinese, having both 
ancient and contemporary parallels in Europe and elsewhere. Ling’s efforts to articulate her 
‘Multiple Worlds’ without falling back on dichotomisations of ‘the West’ and ‘China’ helps to 
underscore that the ‘Chinese view’ that Qin describes need not be exoticized as a geo-culturally 
specific example. On the contrary, it might even be that contemporary IR theories which have 
assumed an ontology of things and marginalised friendship relations should be considered a 
highly specific exception to a more general global and historical trend (Nordin and Smith 2018, 
389; Smith 2011; Roshchin 2018). 
Contemporary elaborations of a Daoist dialectic have thus begun to reformulate a relational 
ontology that conceives of self and other as distinct but connected. This articulation of 
relationality resonates with a postcolonial or decolonial agenda, as well as with feminist and 
poststructuralist efforts at deconstructing identities. In Ling’s articulation there appears to be a 
clear concern with relating multiple worlds that are incommensurable. The recognition that 
there is other in the self suggests that even Wendtian ‘shared culture’ and Shih’s ‘self that has 
no other’ are replete with otherness and fragmentation. The other is always already there; we 
can and do relate to otherness, both within and beyond the self. This logic points away from 
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facile East/West dichotomisation and from the claim that relationality is simply Chinese and 
rationality is simply Western. The Daoist dialectic tells a more complicated story that 
acknowledges intermingling of self and other, potentially enabling more harmonious politics 
(Hagström and Nordin 2017). Yet questions remain about the normative role of hierarchy and 
equality in this dialectic. Could there be identities outside the yin-yang dialectic, or do we need 
to allow it to assume the role of a ‘master concept’ that risks falling back into the kind of totality 
that is criticized in Zhao’s theorisation of Tianxia? If the Daoist dialectic enables parity or 
equality in the relations between worlds, is this compatible with dominance and deference in 
yin-yang relationality? Qin elaborates what he terms relational power as something an actor 
possesses by being well connected, but there seems to be more to be said here about 
conceptualising power and hierarchy in the Daoist dialectic. 
 
4) Aporetic relationality: the other is anterior to the self 
 
The final conceptualisation questions the very attempt to relate to the other as other. It ties 
together the third form of relationality (the other in the self) with the first (where the self has 
no relation to otherness). The seeming impossibility of relating to the other has been 
emphasised by readings of a Judeo-Christian divine by thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Levinas, 
and Derrida, which generated some debate in scholarship on the philosophy of religion, and 
particularly discussions of ineffability and meaning of life. One could also draw parallels here 
to psychoanalytic traditions and thinkers like Lacan, and their emphasis on constitution by lack 
– though some would question the applicability of psychoanalysis outside a particular 
European experience. More recently, Dillon has argued for a poststructuralist commitment to 
the ‘anteriority of radical relationality’ (Dillon 2000). By this he means that ‘nothing is without 
being in relation, and that everything is – in the way that it is – in terms and in virtue of 
relationality’ (Dillon 2000, 4). Most importantly, however, this ‘anteriority of radical 
relationality’ is conceptualised in terms of ‘relationality with the radically non-relational’ 
(Dillon 2000, 4). This radically non-relational is the other, ‘the utterly intractable, that which 
resists being drawn into and subsumed by relation albeit it transits all relationality as a 
disruptive movement that continuously prevents the full realization or final closure of 
relationality, and thus the misfire that continuously precipitates new life and new meaning’ 
(Dillon 2000, 5). The other, as the intractable, therefore defines the limit of relationality. How 
can it then be possible to be in radical relationality with this radically non-relational other? 
Even naming it seems to domesticate it and deny its alterity. Yet, Dillon insists, we always 
already are. That, he points out, is why Derrida refers to it as an ‘aporia’ (Dillon 2000; Derrida 
1993). An aporia is a kind of impasse. It is a moment of undecidability or paradox which 
destabilises or undermines the very terms and context that establishes it. The aporia that 
Derrida and Dillon identify therefore marks the persistence of the radically non-relational in 
the relational, and it will always confound any notion of final order – which also means there 
will always be more ordering yet to come. 
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This point resonates significantly with Buddhist, Daoist, and by consequence Confucian 
accounts. As Hall and Ames have argued, Ancient Chinese thinking does not presuppose a 
single-ordered world (Hall and Ames 1995, xviii). The opening chapter of the Daodejing, 
characterises the Dao (‘the way’ or ‘the real’) as follows: 
 
The way that can be spoken of 
Is not the constant way (Laozi 1996, I:1). 
 
This is repeated in the Daodejing which restates that ‘The way conceals itself in being nameless’ 
(Laozi 1996, XXXII:72, XLI:92). Naming and knowing can grapple to some extent with 
aspects of the real, but it is totally inadequate to the purpose of truly understanding the real. 
Ultimately, the Dao is unknowable, and the truth is ineffable (Lau 1996, xviii). Yet the Dao is 
anterior to all, as ‘The way begets one; one begets two; two begets three; three begets the 
myriad creatures’ (Laozi 1996, XLII:93; IV:11). Although some interpret these ‘myriad 
creatures’ as an expression of Dao as an essence, we suggest that there can be at least one 
reading made where the Dao is an anterior non-originary origin that does not produce one 
single-ordered world (which again, we believe, resonates with Derrida). 
 
In this way, Dillon’s poststructuralist ‘anteriority of radical relationality’ and Laozi’s Dao are 
significantly different to the commitments of Shih, Zhao, Qin, or complexity theorists. These 
thinkers draw from relationality a desire to understand the ‘implicate orderliness’ of the 
anteriority of radical relationality (Bohm 1980). In contrast, Dillon and Laozi emphasise 
disruption, disorder and the impossibility of conceiving of a ‘shared culture’ where knowable 
relations can be pinned down in prescribed roles. Ultimately, relationality escapes and exceeds 
all attempts to share and know, and there is always a surplus or an excess to the meaning we 
perceive. The insistence that, however impossibly and aporetically, we retain this anteriority 
of the other, or of radical relationality, seems to be a key point made by poststructuralist 
analyses such as Dillon’s and our reading here of the Dao. Future discussions about 
relationality need to take this into account and question how this is done and how we situate 




This article opened by asking a question about the relationship between self and other. It was 
asked how self relates to other, and what otherness might mean. This question was motivated 
by recent scholarship in IR that challenges a Eurocentric construction of otherness as mere 
difference. Such a construction leads to the assimilation and dominance of otherness, and the 
devaluation and dismissal of epistemologies, ontologies, and world views that cannot be 
incorporated into this purview. In this way, that approach lays the foundations for, and 
reproduces, a colonial logic and practice. The article attempted to trace the possibility of 
challenging this logic by examining how otherness has been constructed in a number of recent 
writings which focus on the relationality of self and other. In order to do this, it focused on one 
(promising) sense of otherness: radical otherness or alterity. It was hoped that such an otherness 
would provide a limit to the colonial enterprise. In constructing a typology of four different 
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accounts of otherness, it was found that the identification and preservation of radical otherness 
posed significant problems for relationality. It would seem that radical otherness makes 
relationality between self and other impossible, but without radical otherness there is a very 
real danger of domination and assimilation. Moreover, this was found to be common to both 
Chinese and Western endeavours. 
 
Yet, although no clear way forward has been found, this is not to say that one cannot, and does 
not, exist. Such a claim would be to be consumed by the conceit that one perspective can 
explain all; and that the system could be completed. In this respect, whilst one construction of 
otherness has been traced in this article, this is by no means the only construction. At least three 
further lines of enquiry immediately suggest themselves. First, this article must accept criticism 
insofar as it has been limited to thinking about the self-other relation from one direction only. 
In other words, what would it mean to see things from the position of ‘the other’? More space 
would be needed to explore this question, but it returns to important themes already raised by 
this article. In seeing the relationship from only one direction we exclude the experience and 
perspective of the other, an experience and perspective which might not be framed in terms of 
the self. This also raises the question as to whether the other sees itself in a relationship with 
the self at all. We are then thrown back to doubting the possibility of relationality. The second 
line of enquiry is to construct a more complete picture than what has been drawn here by 
investigating the notions of otherness (and self) that this article has noted but left in abeyance. 
If it is the case that ‘radical otherness’ runs into an aporia, perhaps this aporia can be traversed 
by back-tracking and trying a different route. The third line would be to try to draw a more 
diverse picture by including what has been left out of this picture. This would include not only 
the nuance and difference that is present in both the Chinese and Western traditions, but also 
the contributions and insights from thoughts, cultures and traditions beyond these foci. We 
must always be aware that in this discussion of the relation between self and other, there are 
‘other others’ – both in the sense of voices and perspectives which have been left out and in 
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